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 Serres's New Landscape for Knowledge 
 
Educated in both the sciences and the humanities, Serres sees as extremely problematic 
the rift between these two fields, and that they could each individually be considered 
sufficient for a responsible knowledge. His conception of time as "extraordinarily 
complex," unexpected, and non-linear informs his concepts of interdisciplinarity, 
progress and knowledge. The problem of time, its representation, and the passage of time 
are crucial to Serres’s understanding of knowledge. It may well be that "the advantage 
which [would] result [would be] a new organization of knowledge: the whole landscape 
is changed"1. 
 
1. Time and the Rise of Reason 
1.1. Interdisciplinarity 
Serres believes that it is the separation between sciences and humanities, "this divorce, 
which informs the time of the 'contemporaneous' concepts and thoughts" (CS 79). He 
refuses this separation. Serres himself chose to be educated in both the sciences and the 
humanities2 and has successfully endeavored to maintain this "double path" throughout 
his life. He deplores that through the division between sciences and humanities, the 
university produces on the one hand "pure" scientists, and on the other "pure" humanities 
scholars. He believes that it makes it all the more difficult to be aware of, and to explore, 
relationships and connections among disciplines. He also believes that this division is 
reflected in our representation of time and in our concept of education where only the 
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scientists are recognized as contemporary, and humanities scholars are looked upon as 
essentially turned toward the ancient times of poetry and literature. Thus the humanities 
become something nobody needs at a time when the sciences tell us "all" about the world 
and humans in most “efficient,” “productive,” “functional” and “performative” ways. 
Serres dates the onset of this separation from the eighteenth century, when everything but 
science started to be looked upon as devoid of reason, rendering humanities, literature, 
and history – along with the past – irrational. The nineteenth century, which relegated all 
literary works to the domain of myths and dreams (Sturm and Drang), reinforced this 
perception. Hence, "the history of science, epistemology, the scientists, and even the man 
in the street" (CS 80) maintain that there is reason in the present and lack of it in the past. 
Serres advocates “a multitude of learnings from which seem to spring the freedom of 
invention, and therefore, the freedom of thought.”3 
  
1.2. Progress and the rise of reason 
Historical time is by tradition basically linear. Serres points out that "we conceive time 
like an irreversible line – interrupted or continue – of acquisitions and inventions" (CS 
76). In the context of modernity, each step in time goes forth, toward ever more 
exactitude, more “truth,” "leaving behind … a trail of errors corrected at last" (CS 76). 
When one follows time along a linear path, in a sequential succession of events, the latest 
occurrence is always said to be the most correct. This leads to the "Descartes syndrome" 
according to which "reason did not exist before I, no one thought before I did" (CS 77). 
Indeed, scientists maintain there was no rationality before they came along. Progress is 
like a mountain pick, and we, in the present time, continuously stand on its point, "at the 
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extreme [point] of development" (CS 77). Consequently, this perspective enables us to be 
permanently right, since truth and correctness are inherent in the present moment.  
 
Serres does not subscribe to this concept. He describes this linear perception of time as 
"not even a line, but the trajectory of the race to first place" (CS 78). He distinguishes 
time which advances on a line, time which is a chronological date on the line of time, 
from time as duration, as a portion of existence. He does not equate the progression of 
time with the rise of reason, accompanied by a rejection of the past. He sees any break in 
time as "a dogmatic exclusion" where all that which is non-"contemporary" is rejected 
into antiquity, or archaism. Nothing is "false" any longer, but "obsolete" instead. He 
warns against the danger of ignoring the past, and sees a real risk in repeating it, as well 
as a colossal waste. One must struggle against forgetting. For example, declares Serres, if 
you set on an island all that which is right by reason, and all that which gives the right to 
bear judgement, and abandon everything else, how do you know what is left in all that 
has been discarded? Is it not tantamount to bringing about a culture void, ignorance and 
illiteracy? And since the past is ignored, does it not run the risk of being repeated? 
  
1.3.Time and chaos 
Both sciences and humanities assume the linearity of time; "be it cumulative, continue, or 
interrupted, it always remains linear" confirms Serres (CS 88). In contrast, in his work on 
Leibniz (1968),4 Serres presented his "first intuition" that "time does not always flow 
along a straight line … but according to an extraordinarily complex variety" (CS 89), like 
a river: “The Tiber's shallow waters uncover the deposits of its turbulence. The 
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sandbanks are stilled whirlpools, slightly stuck in a longer time. The hourglass, as if 
viscous, halts the flowing time.”5 Actually, time does not flow, declares Serres, it 
"percolates." Some filters through, some does not. He associates the evolution of time to 
the theory of chaos, complex and unexpected, where things which appear very close to 
one another may in fact be far apart and vice versa. He believes that "creased" time is a 
much better paradigm than the traditional time-line to represent the multi-dimentionality 
of time and have a better understanding of history. The creased handkerchief, like the car, 
represents the multi-temporality of any historical event, referring simultaneously to the 
past, the present, and the future.  
 
2. Breaking Barriers... 
Serres's notion of time as non-linear, creased, and chaotic challenges the traditional 
concept of knowledge which, like progress, seems to advance on the linear path of 
historicism, leaving behind anything deemed passé, archaic, obsolete. His new 
organization of knowledge proposes to break two barriers: one between past and present, 
and the other, relatively recently established, between disciplines, especially between 
sciences and humanities. His own career illustrates a lifelong attempt at accomplishing 
just that, through his education and his works. 
 
2.1....Between past and present: contemporaneity 
Serres questions the "rise of reason" implied by the traditional linear time, the split 
between "obsolete past" and "rational present," and the usual historicist pattern of "reason 
after, absence of reason before." He stresses the danger of ignoring the past: not only do 
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we run the risk of repeating it, mistakes and all, but what was once considered as an 
"error" of the (supposedly irrational) past, may reappear as a novel discovery (e.g., 
fractals); not only does "forgetting" expose us to repetition, but by rejecting past 
knowledge, we may end up repeating some arguments even more ancient – education is 
fraught with such examples of "brand new" concepts, paradigms or methods. In the end, 
what is wholly of "our time" only?  Who can vouch that some aspect of knowledge is 
totally contemporary? Serres asserts that in fact "each invention unveils some reality as 
well as some historicity" (CS 87), while both science and historicism maintain the 
assumption of time as linear, "be it cumulative, continuous, or interrupted" (CS 88). 
 
Serres believes that the theory of chaos should help understand his theory of knowledge 
based on time as non-linear, folded, creased, or stretched like a handkerchief, folding and 
twisting like flames, or percolating like a river. The traditional linear time theory is often 
a source of difficulties, insufficient and naive in its historicist explanations, whereas 
Serres sees time and the knowledge it carries as much more complex, more like the 
dough kneaded by the baker. Furthermore, in the traditional Western mode of thinking, 
revolutions cut this historicist time-line of knowledge into sections. How odd that at one 
point in time, we stop everything to start again from point zero, "attributing negative 
numbers to the preceding segment of time" (CS 201). In every case, the main action is to 
"discard everything we know in order to invent, at last" (CS 102). As a result, we loose 
sight of the knowledge we have gained. This historicist linear ever forward movement 
"through ruptures and revolutions, the most repetitive of all … builds a screen so opaque 
and dark that we cannot even see our real archaisms" (CS 202). Serres prefers to 
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understand these revolutions as "only apparent," very much like the movements of the 
Tiber flowing between its banks, or of the tectonic plates shifting over their magma, 
concealing "slow and viscous fluxes," deep movements "which, in a totally different 
time-frame, bring us in communication with the past" (CS 203) and the knowledge it 
holds. In Serres's theory of knowledge, each event is "multitemporal, simultaneously 
harking to some past, present, and future" (CS 92). 
 
2.2....Between disciplines: interdisciplinarity 
In the traditional understanding of knowledge, the distinction between "obsolete past" 
and "rational present" articulates with the distinction made between humanities and 
sciences: reason is removed from the humanities as well as from the past, and both are 
relegated to irrationality. Fewer and fewer seem interested in the humanities and their 
references to an assumed ancient and archaic knowledge. On the other hand, scientists are 
perceived as the only contemporary scholars who "really talk about the world or the 
brain, mathematics and physics" (CS 80). Serres's theory of knowledge refuses this rift 
between "exact sciences" and "human sciences." In his education and his works, he 
shows a triple commitment to philosophy, literature, and sciences – all branches, in which 
he also includes mathematics. He stresses that this separation did not always exist. In the 
eighteenth century, scholars had already tried to deny any rationality to anything which 
did not fall under their label of "science," and the nineteenth century "confirmed this 
enormous decision, consigning all literary movements to myths and dreams (Sturm und 
Drang)" (CS 81). Even within the field of science, classifications have changed several 
times these past decades while new areas were born and developed. These distinctions 
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and fragmentations were confirmed by educational institutions and the organization of 
their curricula, and by universities which produce "on the one hand pure scientists, and 
on the other pure humanities scholars" (CS 87). As a consequence, humanities have lost 
credibility and status while much emphasis and support is placed on "scientific 
intelligence," in, and by, institutions. Serres insists that knowledge should not be 
considered the privilege of one field or one discipline only, and that "reason is 
statistically distributed everywhere: no one can claim its exclusive possession" (CS 79). 
 
Another development seems to have contributed to reinforcing this deep cleavage 
between sciences and humanities when it became obvious that the relationship between 
science and society, knowledge, and morality had to be rethought. After the explosion of 
the first atomic bomb, it was particularly urgent to rethink the traditional scientific 
optimism. Indeed, while all areas of science were undergoing some major changes, their 
relations to the world and humanity were experiencing some profound modifications. But 
even so, although scholars of Serres's generation were becoming suspicious of scientism, 
traditional epistemology was not asking any questions yet about, for example, the relation 
between science and violence. Notwithstanding, while so-called "Big Science" was off to 
an enthusiastic start marked by renewed efficiency and characterized by the "Manhattan 
Project," a number of physicists were already leaving the field of science in fear of 
contributing to what was to become the atomic bomb (e.g., Ettore Majora). If the first 
scientific revolution was mainly concerned with issues of methodology, the latest ones 
touched upon such domains as morality, sociopolitics, and philosophy. 
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2.3. The myth of reason and progress: "morality" and knowledge 
According to Serres, both rifts between past and present and between sciences and 
humanities, characteristic of the current approach to knowledge and reinforced by 
educational institutions, are a serious source of problems for what he considers an 
intrinsic part of knowledge and calls "morality." For him, it is a matter of "loss": "as 
sciences advance, we rarely evaluate the substantial loss of culture which corresponds to 
this gain" (CS 85). These problems take two aspects: on the one hand, they are identified 
by Bruno Latour with the "classic theme of the Sorcerer's apprentice" (CS 249); and, on 
the other hand, they may be summed up by Rabelais's sentence, "Science6 without 
conscience is nothing but the ruin of the human soul." 
 
Especially since the middle of the last century, sciences and the techniques and 
technology they produce have experienced an unprecedented powerful rise and 
hegemony in all existing areas, while new ones emerged and grew very rapidly. They 
seemed to expand the boundaries of our knowledge, while pushing back the limits of 
what we could not control, leading the (Western) world to believe that, perhaps, they 
could free humanity of all boundaries and limits forever. Had they not enabled us, for 
example, to organize labor and production – and consumption – as well as 
communication much more efficiently, while allowing us to control sex and reproduction, 
aging and youth, illnesses and diseases – to prevent or to propagate – that is life and 
death, on both individual and collective, local and global levels? Previously, our 
decisions, choices and actions were guided by the distinction we had learned to make 
between what we were responsible for, and what we were not responsible for, what we 
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could control, and what we could not control. Sciences and techniques erased this 
distinction and by the same token the necessity of this "wisdom." Now we believe 
ourselves "masters of what used to control us" (CS 247), and we hope to gain control of 
the totality of the world, even the universe and beyond. No longer is there any limit to 
what we can do, including blowing up the planet and destroying humanity. Serres 
belongs to the generation of men and women who were thoroughly educated in science, 
who witnessed, if not participated in, the profound changes which worked through all its 
areas, and had to grow up through the aftermaths of Guernica, the Blitzkrieg, the 
Holocaust and Hiroshima. He declares: "The history of Western humanity, so advanced 
in its scientific and cultural achievements, had probably never gone so far into 
abomination" (CS 13). While the scientific fields grew exponentially, just as many 
questions of ethics were becoming increasingly pressing. 
 
Parallel to the apparent triumph of science, we witness a regression and a degradation of 
education and culture, a proliferation of ignorance, prejudices, illiteracy, and "alternative" 
beliefs. A solid, coherent, balanced, "harmonious" program of education, equally open to 
all, is dangerously missing in our time.7 In the past, wisdom helped endure the inevitable 
hardships then considered a consequence of the limits of knowledge and an intrinsic part 
of life, conditions for which we were not responsible. In those days, wisdom, "morality, 
was a survival technique" which the advances of science, by pushing back the limits of 
necessity, "rendered superfluous, almost obsolete" (CS 247). "Traditional morality" 
became useless, incomprehensible. However, that was nothing but an illusion, the 
blinding effect of the lightning speed at which sciences had advanced and of their recent 
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successes. Somewhere along, we had lost our ability to make the distinction between the 
things we can control, and those we cannot. In fact, we forget that while sciences seem to 
hold "all the powers, all the knowledge, all the reason, all the rights too" (CS 131), or 
perhaps because they do, they also carry all the problems and responsibilities.  
 
Scientific rationality is insufficient: "the questions tossed around since the dawn of times 
by what we call the humanities help rethink those posed today about and because of the 
sciences" (CS 46). Serres's theory of knowledge advocates breaking the barriers between 
these two fields. Moreover, given the new responsibilities brought by the unprecedented 
developments in science and technology, Serres believes that the exploration of their 
junction is vital: "today, we live and think at this intersection" (CS 208). He emphasizes 
the necessity to establish "links" among disciplines, rather than cling to the myth of 
"absolute knowledge," since each technique transforms our relations to the world and at 
the same time the relations among individuals. If not, the humanities run the risk of 
remaining disconnected from the world, and the sciences of becoming inhuman (CS 208). 
Serres imagined a "third instruction" which would establish the link between sciences and 
humanities, with a fictitious character he named Tiers Instruit. 
 
To illustrate his point, Serres uses two metaphors. In Kepler's revolution and its double 
focus, science and the humanities are the double source of the Keplerian revolution of 
knowledge, which, in Serres’s metaphoric analysis, functions elliptically. A "third 
knowledge" plays the role of moderator and evaluator, keeping track of the distance 
between the two foci, of their relations and interactions, and of the productivity and 
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"fecundity of this double and no longer single attractive command or regulation. This is 
the program of study where the third knowledge follows the new law of Kepler" (CS 
268). The other metaphor is weaving a cloth, where sciences are the woof and humanities 
the warp. A "third instruction" knots the threads and makes the creation of the cloth 
possible; pursuing Serres's metaphor, I would add that this third is instrumental in the 
strength and beauty of the cloth, remembering that Serres calls beauty "the third culture" 
or "the third instruction" (CS 266-7).  
 
Serres argues that neither field in isolation is sufficient for a responsible knowledge. He 
calls for the necessity of "a reunion, a link, a synthesis," in place of "where there is 
precisely nothing but schizophrenia, exploded culture or destruction" (CS, 46), in fact, 
the potential for global destruction. His ideal of "wise," responsible knowledge (in which 
he includes culture) is a métissage of disciplines, across time. 
  
3. Conclusion 
Serres's endeavor not only to break barriers between and within the disciplines of 
sciences and humanities, and between past and present, but also his efforts to establish 
links and relations between and among them are well represented in his works and 
illustrated in his own life experiences. He sees the problems of responsibility and what he 
calls "morality" raised by the relations between sciences and violence as dominating 
everything in life and knowledge. In order to gain knowledge, in order to raise our level 
of understanding of the world and the human condition, we should not repeat the move of 
absolute rupture with the past, nor between disciplines. Scholars with a "good knowledge 
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of hard sciences and…the humanities, that is who would have both rigor and culture" 
would be less likely to accept lies carried by ideologies, and to lose sight of the human 
factor. 
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